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with Regard to Disclosures about
Payment for Participation in
Recruitment Materials
Megan S. Wright and Christopher T. Robertson

Introduction
The payment of human subjects is an area where
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) have wide discretion. Although the “Common Rule”1 requires the provision of full information to human research participants to secure valid consent, the Rule is silent on the
issue of payment.2 Still, some federal agencies offer
guidance on the matter. For example, the National
Science Foundation (NSF) cautions that high payments for risky research “may induce a needy participant to take a risk that they normally would prefer not to take.”3 For research under its purview, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance provides that “[a]dvertisements may state that subjects
will be paid, but should not emphasize the payment
or the amount to be paid, by such means as larger
or bold type.”4 One might read the FDA guidance to
permit the advertisement for human subjects to state
the specific amount of payment, as long as it is not
emphasized.
While there is a larger debate about whether and
how human subjects should be paid, we focus on the
permissibility of investigators advertising the amount
of compensation that they intend to pay human subjects. Can a pre-recruitment postcard offer a patient
$50 to complete a survey? May a sign on a public bus
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mention that the study will pay up to $2,500? Potential research participants must decide whether to
answer the phone or whether to show up at a screening site, and they may utilize such payment information to inform those decisions. These preliminary
decisions are made prior to the formal consent stage
of research, where complete information about risks
and benefits is provided.
For both practical and ethical reasons, recruitment
is a sensitive stage of research. In practical terms, the
initial solicitations are important for recruiting an
appropriate and unbiased sample, without excessive
delay.5 On the other hand, IRBs may seek to regulate
disclosure about payment to protect human subjects
from being unduly influenced by money, which may
prevent them from fairly evaluating the risks of participation.6 On this view, people might actually make
better initial decisions about whether to pursue a
research opportunity if they were blinded to payment
information. Nonetheless, such a ban runs against
the grain of other bioethical imperatives for informed
decision making.7
In this sensitive domain, it is unknown how IRBs
have responded to the discretion allowed by the Common Rule and the guidance given by the FDA. In particular, have IRBs developed policies about whether
researchers are allowed to provide precise payment
information for study participation in recruitment
materials? Prior research has shown heterogeneity
across IRBs on a variety of other matters,8 but it is difficult to know whether these variations reflect differences in policy or differences in how IRBs handle cases
presented. Examination of positive rules, rather than
outcomes of cases, may shed light on that question.
In this paper, we investigate IRB policies on disclosing the amount of compensation in recruitment
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materials from the top 100 institutions by receipt of
NIH funding in 2012. We find wide heterogeneity, and
conclude by recommending a uniform national policy
permitting such disclosures.

Background
Much of the literature on payment for human subjects consists of a debate about the ethics of making
any payment at all, and whether payment should be
characterized as “compensation,” an “incentive,” or as a
“benefit” to the subject.9 Ruth Grant and Jeremy Sugarman likely represent a scholarly consensus on the
permissibility of using incentives in human subjects
research:
Incentives can be used to recruit subjects in
many situations without any ethical qualms
where all other ethical criteria are met — that
is to say, incentives themselves are not the ethical problem here, generally speaking.… We have
argued that incentives become problematic when
conjoined with the following factors, singly or
in combination with one another. Where the
subject is in a dependency relationship with
the researcher, where the risks are particularly
high, where the research is degrading, where
the participant will only consent if the incentive is relatively large because the participant’s
aversion to the study is strong, and where the
aversion is a principled one — when these conditions are present, the use of incentives is highly
questionable.10
Some have argued that in order to treat research participants justly, they should be viewed as wage laborers, which arguably protects their “moral interests,”
but also allows researchers to use compensation as a
recruitment tool.11
Other scholars argue that compensating research
participants can “seduce” individuals into participating in research when they may otherwise not.12 This
is a concern of many IRB members and researchers
who worry that payments or providing health care
can unduly influence potential research subjects.13
In a survey of human subjects protection professionals, Emily Largent and colleagues found more comfort with reimbursing research subjects’ expenses
incurred to participate in a study and for compensating subjects for their time; there was substantially
less support for payment as an incentive or compensation for risk.14 The authors hypothesize that IRB
professionals prefer subjects to volunteer for a study
for altruistic reasons,15 but contend that there is no
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real difference between payment for reimbursement
and compensation and payment as an incentive from
the perspective of a potential research subject.16 As a
matter of principle, Largent and colleagues argue that
“payment never coerces” and that “payment raises
ethical concerns about the validity of consent only
when it unduly influences participants by distorting
their perception of research risks and benefits. In the
absence of evidence that such distortions occur, IRBs
should be reluctant to conclude that offers of payment
undermine the validity of consent.”17
The findings of another empirical study indicate
that payments do increase individuals’ willingness
to participate in research, as traditional economics would expect.18 Empirical research has, however,
failed to substantiate the claim that payment information causes irrational choices in human subjects
research.19 In fact, scholars have found that offers of
compensation made subjects more perceptive about
risks.20
Prior research has also shown that studies vary
considerably as to how much they pay for similar burdens. One study examined the research participant
payment amount and consent forms of 467 studies at
eleven IRBs and determined that there is significant
variation in research subject payment practices (e.g.,
amount of payment) and no clear explanation for differences between studies, between IRBs, and within
studies and IRBs. 21 Following up on unanswered
questions, a survey of researchers and IRB chairpersons was conducted to determine what factors influence the decisions to offer payment to research participants and to determine payment amounts. They
found that the most important reason for payment is
“compensation,” but that reimbursement for expenses,
a token of appreciation, and incentives for participating also matter.22 Similarly, prior research with human
subjects has shown that they view the prospect of payment as an important, material factor in their decision
to pursue a research opportunity.23
Much less scholarship has focused on the precise
question of whether the amount of compensation
should be advertised to subjects deciding whether to
pursue an opportunity to participate. Katrina Bramstedt reiterates the FDA guidance that “[a]dvertising
study remuneration is not unethical as long as it is
not highlighted or emphasized causing it to stand out
from other concepts in the advertisement.”24 In her
review of studies in a clinical trial database (which
potential subjects use to find opportunities to participate in studies), Bramstedt found that “[s]pecific
compensation (e.g., dollar amount) for study participation was mentioned in 56 (47%) of 119 advertise-
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ments.”25 Bramstedt expressed concern that some
studies unethically put too much emphasis on the
compensation, contrary to the guidance provided by
the FDA. Bramstedt advises that both IRBs and database organizers (because some IRBs approve unethical advertisements) monitor and approve descriptions
of research on the databases.26
In another study, researchers examined nine universities, along with 23 other research organizations
(drug companies, contract research organizations,

acteristics. This paper will address these gaps in the
literature.

Methods
We downloaded from the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) website a list of the top 100 research institutions by receipt of NIH funding in 2012. We used NIH
funding as an inclusion criterion because it served as a
rough proxy of the volume of human subjects research
being performed at each institution.

No prior research study has characterized the policies of research institutions as
they relate to the issue of advertising the amount of payment to human subjects.
Nor has any study examined potential associations between those policies and
institutional characteristics. This paper will address these gaps in the literature.
and independent IRBs), to characterize their policies
regarding paying research subjects.27 Surprisingly, the
majority of the organizations in their sample did not
have written guidelines. In regards to payment, just
under half of the organizations in the sample restrict
how payment can appear in advertisements, and four
of the organizations do not permit the amount to be
placed in recruitment materials, although the materials may specify that subjects will be paid. 28 It is
unclear whether such variation in IRB policies exists
on a larger scale.
The normative debate about paying human research
subjects tends to be conclusory when it comes to the
question of advertising compensation amounts. For
instance, while Christine Grady asserts that “[a]n
IRB should also review the presentation of information about payment in consent documents as well as
related advertisements and information sheets,” she
does not provide suggestions about advertising and
recruitment, nor how IRBs should judge payment
information on recruitment materials.29 And in Trisha
Phillips’ critique of study advertisements that highlight benefits of participation, she argues that “[t]he
amount of money offered to subjects and the way in
which the offer is presented is relevant to determining whether the quality of the consent is adequate,”
but does not recommend any specific policies about
advertising for IRBs to follow.30
No prior research study has characterized the policies of research institutions as they relate to the issue
of advertising the amount of payment to human subjects. Nor has any study examined potential associations between those policies and institutional char-
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NIH funding is presumably skewed towards medical research, although non-medical research is also
subject to the Common Rule and the purview of IRB
policies. At the same time, some non-medical institutions may receive sizeable amounts of NIH funding.
We coded whether the institutions were medical centers or schools to determine whether there are differences in permissibility of advertising levels of compensation by type of research institution. We took the
NIH database entities at face value, although some
institutions appeared to be comprehensive universities (which may include medical schools) and others
appeared to be more specialized entities, themselves
schools of medicine (or public health). Only those
entities that explicitly referred to medicine in their
name were coded as medical schools. We attempted to
find the relevant IRB for each entity listed to code the
appropriate policy.
We then recruited and trained two research assistants (second- and third-year law students) to identify
each institution’s website for its IRB and to search relevant documents until they found a policy that regulated or provided guidelines for advertisements or
other recruitment materials for human subjects. The
research assistants also provided links to the document, and extracted the relevant text of the policy or
guideline, along with a URL and citation. One of the
authors (MW) also independently searched for the
relevant documents. One author (MW) and the two
research assistants independently coded all 100 institutions’ policy or guideline with regard to advertising
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials.
Coding instructions from one of the co-authors (CR)
specified that coders were “to carefully distinguish
377
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between the recruitment/advertising stage and the
informed consent stage…[and] please look carefully
at the distinction between disclosing the amount of
compensation, versus disclosing whether there will
be any compensation.… We are focused on whether
the researcher can say the specific amount of money
involved.” Coders were given a six-level instrument, to
specify whether each institution:
1. prohibits such disclosures,
2. discourages them,
3.	has no stated policy (and thus implicitly
allows them),
4. explicitly allows them,
5. encourages them, or
6. requires them.
See Table 1 below for examples of institutions that fell
into these six categories of policies.
A typical policy in level 3 is one that prohibits
researchers from emphasizing the amount of payment, but fails to explicitly state that the amount of
payment may be disclosed, as in the FDA guidance. We
acknowledge that level 3’s notion of implicit allowance
involves a step of inference. It is possible, instead, that
IRB staffers at such institutions are themselves heterogeneous about how they handle investigator advertisements. At the level of policy, however, we believe it

sensible to characterize such institutions as “implicitly
allowing” advertising the amounts of compensation.
Then, one of the co-authors (CR) reviewed all three
primary coders’ excerpts and codes, and coded whether
they were in numerical agreement, and if not, then
resolved any discrepancies, explaining his decision in
writing. After the first 55 institutions were quadruplecoded in this way, the two authors then recoded all
100 policies, in light of the prior codes, which revealed
how the independent readers of the policy understood it. In these final codes, the two authors were
in agreement 84.88% of the time (kappa=.78), which
indicates “substantial agreement” or high inter-rater
reliability.31
We then calculated frequencies for each of the six
possible policy guidelines with regard to advertising
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials
in order to determine the extent of variation amongst
IRBs. Because it was not possible to find information
on the policies for 11 institutions (by internet searches
or query emails sent from one of the research assistants
to the particular IRB), only 89 institutions remain in
the final sample. These eleven missing institutions are
distinct from the institutions we coded as “level 3,”
which had an accessible policy relating to advertising
materials, but did not specifically address whether the
amount of compensation could be stated therein.

Table 1
Codes with Examples of Institutions and Policy Language
Code

Institution

Policy Language

1. Prohibit

New York University School
of Medicine

Researchers may not “specify exact monetary compensation amounts.”

2. Discourage

University of Wisconsin
Madison

“If participants will be paid for their time/effort, it is recommended that the
wording ‘Compensation Available’ be used in recruitment materials, rather
than specifying a specific amount. Statements of payment should not be in
larger type than the rest of the ad.”

3. Implicitly Allow

Harvard University School
of Public Health

“THE ADVERTISEMENT: Does NOT emphasize the payment or the amount
to be paid, by such means as larger or bold type” .

4. Explicitly Allow

“Any advertisement … may include, where appropriate: A straightforward
University of North Carolina
and truthful description of the incentives to the subject for participation in the
Chapel Hill
study (e.g., payment).”

5. Encourage

University of Pennsylvania

Recruitment materials should include the following information: “a description of the compensation/reimbursement. Recruitment materials should NOT
include…Overemphasis on compensation but should not emphasize the
payment or the amount to be paid.”

6. Require

Albert Einstein College of
Medicine Yeshiva University

“If remuneration is offered, give actual or at least ball park amounts; e.g. up to....
Payment guidelines are available through the CCI/IRB administration offices.”
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Results
Our review of the top 100 institutions found that the
majority permit investigators to advertise the amount
of compensation, but simply regulate the placing of
undue emphasis on the amount of payment in recruitment materials (such as by bolding or highlighting
payment), a rule which parallels the FDA’s guidelines
for human subjects research for filings before that
agency. Table 2 summarizes our results.
Of the 89 NIH-funded institutions in 2012 in our
sample, 8 (8.99%) forbid investigators from disclosing
the amount of compensation in recruitment materials;
5 (5.62%) discourage disclosing the amount of compensation; 45 (50.56%) implicitly allow disclosing the
amount of compensation; 20 (22.47%) explicitly allow
disclosing the amount of compensation; 9 (10.11%)
encourage disclosing the amount of compensation;
and, 2 (2.25%) mandate disclosing the amount of compensation in recruitment materials. If we group institutions’ policies by rough valence, about 15% forbid or
discourage disclosures; three quarters (73%) implicitly
or explicitly allow; and 12% encourage or mandate.
We analyzed whether there were differences by type
of research institution as to whether researchers are
permitted to advertise the amount of compensation to
potential research participants. Specifically, we investigated whether medical schools or centers would differ
from other institutions (i.e., universities and colleges).
There were 24 (26.97%) medical schools or centers
in our sample institutions, and 65 (73.03%) institutions that were not specialized as medical schools or
centers. With 16.67% of medical schools forbidding or
discouraging advertising compensation amounts, and
13.84% of the other institutions doing so, we found no
significant difference (χ2 (1)=0.1118, p=0.738).
Additionally, we investigated whether the rank of institution by receipt of NIH funding was associated with

institutional IRB policies. We divided the institutions in
our sample into quartiles by annual funding, and found
that the lower two quartiles of institutions in our sample
are much more likely than the upper two quartiles to
have policies that implicitly allow (level 3) advertising
compensation (65.12% of institutions in the lower half
of the sample have such a policy compared to 36.96%
of institutions in the upper half). In contrast, the upper
two quartiles are more likely to explicitly allow (level 4)
advertising compensation than the lower two quartiles
(34.78% compared to 9.3%). These differences are large
and statistically significant (χ2(15)=25.936, p=0.039),
although the practical distinction between implicit and
explicit permission may be minor. When dichotomizing whether an institutional policy permits or does not
permit advertising compensation, there is no significant
difference between institutions by rank of NIH funding,
however (χ2(3)=1.299, p=0.729).

Discussion

Our study has shown that there is substantial heterogeneity in IRB policies about specifying the amount of
compensation in recruitment materials, with a significant portion requiring or encouraging what another
significant proportion forbids. On the whole, over
85% of the research institutions in our sample permit
such disclosure, but there is sizeable variation even
amongst these institutions. The majority policy (level
3, 51%) is in accordance with the FDA guidance document’s silent permission, without imposing additional
written specifications; however, the other half of
institutions in the sample vary in some way from this
guidance, either explicitly telling researchers they can
specify the amount of compensation, recommending
that researchers do so, recommending that researchers do not do so, or forbidding or mandating such
disclosures. Almost equal percentages of institutional
policies forbid and discourage such disclosure as do encourage or require, forming a
Table 2
bell-shaped distribution of policies.
Frequency and Percentages of IRB Policies on Advertising
It is unclear what explains or justiCompensation
fies such variation. One could attempt to
explain this heterogeneity in terms of an
underlying heterogeneity in the facts on
Cumulative
Code
Frequency
Percent
the ground. IRBs were originally designed
Percent
as a system of local peer-review,32 and some
Prohibit
8
8.99
8.99
argue that there remains a need for local
Discourage
5
5.62
14.61
IRBs to reflect local values and concerns.33
Implicitly Allow
45
50.56
65.17
It is possible that some institutions have
Explicitly Allow
20
22.47
87.64
overall more vulnerable populations than
other institutions. If research in sensitive
Encourage
9
10.11
97.75
topical areas such as substance abuse and
Mandate
2
2.25
100
treatment or psychiatric conditions, or
Total

89
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100
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research that recruits from populations such as the
drug dependent, homeless, or mentally ill, were clustered geographically, then local IRBs (e.g., those in
large, urban areas) may develop distinctive policies
to protect these populations. It is not clear, however,
that the research performed and subjects recruited in
the same major metropolitan area are so very different
as to warrant research institutions in those areas having different IRB policies, although this variation was
found in our sample.

Shea contend that because IRBs are set up to deal with
medical research rather than social science research,
IRB members “apply regulatory provisions to such
research [field research] that are inappropriate to its
own methodological presuppositions.”35

Recommendations
The federal government has recently acknowledged
the need to reduce ambiguity and delay for investigators,36 something that is exacerbated by heterogeneity

There should be a single rule about the permissibility of
advertising the amount of compensation in recruitment materials. The
Common Rule is silent on this and many other matters, leaving local IRBs
to fill in the gaps. Although IRBs need to be able to reflect local values and
concerns, with regard to this particular policy, wide IRB discretion may be a
sub-optimal form of regulation.
If the heterogeneity in this particular IRB policy
is not due to deliberative, well-considered choices
reflecting local concerns or values, it may be that the
variation in policies regulating research and purporting to protect human subjects are a function of which
institution happens to control, and perhaps which
staff members happened to write, the relevant policy.
It is possible that the human subject populations are
not dissimilar, but instead that some universities have
more paternalistic values than others.34
However, our study has also shown that the more
elite institutions as measured by receipt of NIH funding are more likely to have policies that explicitly allow
investigators to advertise the amount of compensation
research subjects will receive. In contrast, the less elite
institutions are more likely to adhere to the FDA guidance on recruiting human subjects, implicitly allowing
investigators to disclose compensation at the recruitment phase of research. Still, such variation is relatively inconsequential, compared to the differences at
the poles, where some institutions forbid what others
require.
Additionally, our study has demonstrated that
there is no statistically significant difference between
medical and non-medical research institutions as to
whether advertising specific amounts of compensation
is permitted by a particular IRB. It is likely that medical research has a greater degree of risk to the human
subjects than social/behavioral science research, but
such a distinction is not driving variance for this specific policy. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz380

in IRB policies. We propose a way in which this heterogeneity in IRB policies about advertising amounts
of compensation should be resolved.
First, there should be a single rule about the permissibility of advertising the amount of compensation in
recruitment materials. The Common Rule is silent on
this and many other matters, leaving local IRBs to fill
in the gaps. Although IRBs need to be able to reflect
local values and concerns,37 with regard to this particular policy, wide IRB discretion may be a sub-optimal form of regulation. Current heterogeneity in such
policies may impede multi-center research and hinder
the movement of researchers across institutions, and
may also consume scarce local resources in the efforts
to make, disseminate, and enforce all these disparate
rules. Additionally, heterogeneity in the substance of
rules can create an appearance of arbitrariness, which
may undermine the perceived legitimacy of human subjects regulation, for both human subjects and researchers. The FDA’s guidance on advertising amounts of
compensation does provide a focal point nationwide
on this particular question. However, it does not apply
outside the research that is within the FDA’s regulatory
ambit, and it may be too vaguely worded to provide sufficient direction about the permissibility of advertising
amounts of compensation for research participation.
Thus, although the FDA guidance seems to have created a minor consensus, it is incomplete.
Second, we suggest that the single rule should
explicitly permit investigators to disclose in recruitment materials the specific amount of compensation
journal of law, medicine & ethics

Wright and Robertson

for study participation. Importantly, when there are
significant risks to a study, they should also be disclosed in recruitment materials, alongside the amount
of compensation, with similar emphasis. From the
perspective of human subjects, these disclosures of
material information should be allowed. Subjects
need to give voluntary informed consent to participate.38 However, as the FDA has recognized, the
informed consent process actually begins at recruitment.39 Recruitment is a key stage in the research process in which the subject must make an initial decision
about whether to pursue a given opportunity to participate in research. Should she take the time to return a
phone call, or click through a link, or respond to an ad
in the newspaper, or even travel across town to attend
an in-person screening?
IRB policies that prohibit or discourage disclosures
of the amount of compensation in recruitment materials force potential participants to guess as to whether
the amount of payment will make it worthwhile for
them to invest their time and effort in a study. Such
guesses as to the amount of payment are likely to
be unreliable, creating both false positives and false
negatives at this preliminary stage. Proscriptive IRB
policies may result in uninformed refusals by persons
who wrongly assume that the hidden payment will be
too small to be worthwhile, and they also may result in
preliminary uninformed decisions to pursue an opportunity by those who wrongly assume that the hidden
payment will be high enough to be worthwhile. Relatedly, IRB policies that prohibit or discourage disclosures of the amount of compensation in recruitment
materials may unintentionally impose costs on the
human subjects the IRB is trying to protect. Potential participants for whom compensation matters to
their decision to participate in a study may spend time
investigating a research study that they would have
quickly declined participating in if they had known
the amount of compensation.
Moving to consider the perspectives and legitimate
interests of researchers, disclosures about the amount
of compensation for study participation should likewise be permitted. One might argue that investigators
themselves have autonomy and academic freedom
interests, deserving of consideration.40 Additionally, if
a researcher proposes to use a particular mechanism
for recruiting human subjects, that is a prima facie
reason for supposing that the mechanism has instrumental value for scientific progress. For example,
there are situations where researchers and researchfunders decide that offering a particularly generous
level of compensation in an advertisement is required
in order to recruit a sample that is representative of a
difficult-to-reach population and sufficiently robust to
concussions and sports • fall 2014

avoid a selection bias. Of course, these investigators
may be wrong, but IRBs owe some deference to the
methodological expertise of their investigators.41
Still, such IRB deference to investigators should not
be absolute; the IRB process exists to superintend the
research process in order to protect human subjects.
Researchers face immense pressure in competition
for research funding, and this may result in research
recruitment designs that are less scientifically valid.
This concern, however, can be allayed due to other
parts of the IRB process. IRBs weigh scientific validity in assessing concerns for the welfare of human
research subjects, and at least one IRB member needs
to have scientific expertise.42 Prior research has shown
that many of the biomedical scientists on IRB committees scrutinize the proposed research for scientific
merit.43 If the research is not scientifically valid or
increases risks relative to benefits, then the IRB can
deny approval.
Therefore, there is no need for a blanket rule prohibiting disclosures of payment information; IRBs
can instead request that researchers justify their payment amounts and recruitment materials in their
request for research approval, and IRBs can determine
whether the payments are likely to exert undue influence. To the extent that the IRB is concerned that the
amount of compensation will be an undue influence,
the IRB can require that it be reduced or may preclude
investigators from giving it inappropriate emphasis
in recruitment materials. IRBs may also require that
such information be balanced by information about
the risks of the research. Moreover, potential subjects
will learn more about the risks during the informed
consent stage, blunting the concern that they would
be somehow unduly or inappropriately influenced.
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